Rejecting Centralization of Political Authority: Thinking Beyond Substantive Majorities
What view do you subscribe to — the exercise of state power by those who possess the prerogative to wield it should be an instrument for self-enrichment of those in power? Or should it dictate the norms and mechanisms for upholding the rule of law and creating conditions conducive to the well-being and upward mobility of society?
Even if democratic governance was conceptualized and given effect to achieve these very goals of channeling state power for ensuring order and collective growth, precisely how different cogs in the wider system work and engage — or obstruct and defy one another — has ramifications that extend far beyond any common man’s ability to fathom.
The rampant accusations of judicial overreach and claims of parliamentary supremacy frequently emanating from the highest corridors of power in the so-called “largest democracy of this world” are, indeed, very disturbing. They fly in the face of every fundamental assumption that makes the practical functioning of the constitutional machinery possible — instead, they create a scenario wherein constant friction eats away the very credibility of these institutions of state power.
Plato never truly believed in direct rule by the masses. He believed that power should only be exercised by those who possess true knowledge and wisdom. James Madison warns in The Federalist Papers of the consequences of a powerful majority — an “overbearing majority” — exerting force and “tyranny” upon a minority. Of course, shall I mention the golden words of Lord Acton — “Absolute power corrupts absolutely”.
Mere existence of a numerical majority — or substantive majority — cannot by itself translate into a free-pass for whimsical rule and rule against the core principles of law. Numerical strength cannot override and undermine the exercise of a just legal framework. Majorities are created, then they are broken — naturally to give space for new majorities to rise up to the occasion. But staking claim over the entire system and raising objections over the authenticity of what actually is legitimate, with the motive of capturing universal power, is the new norm in Indian parliamentary democracy.
Another very disturbing set of ideas taking hold far and wide are also correlated and worrisome. Direct election by the people may be the viable way to demonstrate the existence of democratic practice, but it does not mean that recurring electoral successes provide a permission to rule by absolute authority. Legislatures are, after all, accountable to the very public whose support they allude to for the purposes of claiming legitimacy.
The very existence of the judiciary as a central pillar of the system is to ensure the vital presence of a neutral arbiter for checks and balances on power — it does not mean obstruction of legislative privileges or disrespect for executive authority. Legislative and substantive majorities, if left unchecked, take no time to translate into authoritarian diktats.
In Federalist XLVII, James Madison warns us all, “The accumulation of all powers... in the same hands... may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”