Strategic Autonomy in an Age of Great Power Competition

The European Union’s comparatively stagnant economic trajectory post-2008 financial crisis, an underlying political current of Euroscepticism in the 2010s, the internal political rupture (in the 2020s) by the slow rise of far-right, authoritarian, anti-immigrant Antisemitic groups, and the misplaced efforts of the bloc’s leadership, in the decade prior, to try to integrate and improve relations with Moscow for creating a sense of economic interdependency with the goal of giving Russia a stake in long-term peace and security relations have all held back the bloc from realizing its true potential.

Ostpolitik led to revelation of Europe’s vulnerability vis-a-vis Moscow as Eurasian expansionist strategic thought finally culminated with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, 2022. It remains fair to state that the European powers have witnessed the consequences of economic dependency on foreign powers — not just any foreign powers but strategic rivals. Chinese competition has deeply hampered the German automobile industry. The Russians chose to turn off the taps and plunge the European continent into darkness and a cold winter. The same economic interdependence that was crafted to give Russia a stake in peace and security with Europe and lead to a détente between the two, was weaponized by Moscow as a tool of strategic leverage. Brussels’ external energy dependence and security was the most vulnerable chokepoint Moscow could take advantage of. There are significant deposits of hydrocarbons in the North Sea and also offshore Norwegian energy deposits, to couple them with the obvious necessity of investing in renewable energy sources such as wind and solar. Scotland happens to be a prime location for high volumes of wind energy generation to help support domestic supply.

But, at least as per my opinion, the defense-related issues happen to be worse — China’s sheer resourcefulness and capacity to outnumber the Free World by carrying out covert espionage for smuggling sensitive defense technology and the long-term strategic planning done in Beijing means there’s a lot to catch-up to. Of course, the United States remains the world leader in cutting-edge advanced defense technologies such as the Rockwell B-1 Lancer, M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), MQ-9B drones, Patriot interceptors, GE F-414 engine, etc. The concerted Chinese strategy to outmaneuver the United States by bogging down U.S. capacity in multiple theaters of conflict and developing its own defense industrial base in the meantime has partially been a success.

But balancing interoperability and integration with relative self-independence is getting trickier day by day with the rise of protectionist economic policy. Decoupling and derisking happen to be two distinguishable concepts. Defense and security remain externally-originating matters of concern, economic stability —or instability — can be induced by both external or internal factors. De-risking involves calibrated disengagement in areas that impact areas of crucial importance and the critical national security environment. Economic decoupling can be viewed as a much broader term. Navigating absolute strategic autonomy in this rapidly evolving (or devolving) security environment is not possible. How, then, must we prepare for this ongoing age of Great Power Competition?

Reindustrialization of major economies of the Free World should be the primary strategic goal in the initial phase. The next version of industrialization might not resemble what we had witnessed in the previous times. But in the next attempt outmost caution should be exercised regarding the degree of dependence created on a foreign rival. The Biden Administration’s excellent decision, in 2022, to restrict and ban the export of advanced computing and semiconductor technology to China must be viewed against this backdrop. A national industrial and defense policy’s coherent implementation is crucial.

Yes, the next globalization most probably will not reach the peak level that it had around the late-20th and early 21st centuries.

Finally, critical initiatives such as Indo Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(IPEF) and the India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor should create noticeable impact as a counterweight to Chinese soft power (which, frankly, has failed on its own). I know the reality hits differently (the entire Gaza conflict started by Hamas terrorists was in part an attempt to stall the developing Saudi-Israel normalization of relations).

Europe has failed by simultaneously trying to pursue an idealized perfect state of relations vis-à-vis its own strategic autonomy, energy security through a détente with Russia and the disastrous economic policy of openness toward China. Absolute strategic autonomy will remain an elusive concept to achieve. Instead, efforts should center around relative autonomy alongside strategic coordination amid the threats faced by the Free World.